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Encyclopedia Britannica - Main :: WAT-WIL |
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WATERLOO CAMPAIGN, 1815 . On February 27, 1815, Napoleon
series of triumphs, his power waxing with every league he covered, and when he reached Paris the Bourbons had fled. But he had soon to turn his attention to war. His sudden return, far from widening the breaches between the allies, had fused them indissolubly together, and the four powers bound themselves to put 15o,00o men apiece under arms and to maintain them in the field until Napoleon
drawn
Great
to the minutest details, by June 1 he had got together p ;ara~~s an army of 360,000 for the defence of France, one half agog. of which was available for field service. In this army was comprised his whole means of defence; for he had no allies. On his return from Elba it is true that Murat, the king of Naples, took his side; but recklessly opening an offensive campaign, Murat was beaten at Tolentino (May 2-3), and he found himself compelled to fly in disguise to France, where the emperor refused him an audience or employment. Herein Napoleon wronged France, for he deprived her of the most brilliant cavalry soldier of the period. Shorn thus of his single ally, the emperor realized that the whole eastern land-frontier of France was open to invasion, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean. By the end of May he had placed his forces as follows to protect his empire. D'Erlon's I. Corps cantoned between Lille and Valenciennes. Reille's II. Corps cantoned between Valenciennes and Avesnes. Vandamme's III. Corps cantoned around Rocroi. Gerard's IV. Corps cantoned at Metz. Lobau's VI. Corps cantoned at Laon. Grouchy's Cavalry Reserve at Guise. Marshal Mortier with the Imperial Guard at Paris. Rapp with the V. Corps (20,000) near Strassburg. 18,5oo more troops under Suchet, Brune
372 was weakened by internal dissensions at the very moment when it was needful to put every man in line to meet the rising tide of invasion surging against the long curving eastern frontier. Napoleon now pondered over his plan of campaign. In Belgium, across an almost open frontier, lay an ever-increasing force of Anglo-Dutch and Prussian troops under Wellington and Blucher. The Rhine frontier was threatened by Schwarzenberg's Austrians (210,000); Barclay de Tolly's Russians (150,0O0) were slowly coming up; and another Austrian force menaced the S.E. frontier of France. The allies determined that they would wage a war without risks, and they were particularly anxious to avoid the risk
Wellington and Blucher should await in Belgium the arrival of the Austrian and Russian masses on the Rhine, about July r, before the general invasion of France was begun. Thereafter, whatever befell, the allied armies would resolutely press forward towards Paris, affording each other mutual support, and with the tremendous weight of troops at their disposal thrust back Napoleon upon his capital , force him to fight in front of it, and drive him when defeated within its works. The end would then be in sight. Thus they had planned the campaign, but Napoleon forestalled them.. In fact, the threatening danger forced his hand and compelled him to strike before he had collected a sufficient army for his defensive needs. Consequently he determined to advance swiftly and secretly against Wellington and Blucher, whose forces, as Napoleon knew, were dispersed over the country of their unenthusiastic ally. Thus he designed to crush a part of the coalition before the Russians and Austrians poured over the eastern frontier. Once Wellington and Bliicher were destroyed he would move southwards and meet the other allies on the Rhine. He might thus compensate for his numerical inferiority by superior mobility and superior leadership.His information showed that Wellington held the western half of Belgium from the Brussels-Charleroi road to the Scheldt, that his base of operations was Ostend, and that his headquarters were at Brussels. Blucher, based on Napoleon's plans. the Rhine at Coblentz, held the eastern half from the Brussels-Charleroi road to the Meuse, and had his headquarters at Namur. The emperor was convinced that nothing could be gained by invading Belgium from the S.E. or W.; such a stroke would surely drive the allies together, and that was never Napoleon's custom. On the other hand, if he struck straight at Charleroi-the allied junction pointhe would drive the " Armee du Nord " like an armoured wedge between the allies, if only he caught them unsuspicious and unready. Forced asunder at the outset, each would (in all probability) fall back along his own line of communication, and the gap thus made between the allies would enable the emperor to manoeuvre between them and defeat them in turn. To gain the best chance of success he would have to concentrate his whole army almost within gunshot of the centre of the enemies' outposts without attracting their attention; otherwise he would find the allies concentrated and waiting for him. Wellington and Blucher were disposed as follows in the early days of June (Map I.). The Anglo-Dutch army of 93,000 with headquarters at Brussels were cantoned: I. Corps (Prince of Orange), 30,200, headquarters Braine-le-Comte, disposed in the area Enghien -Genappe-Mons; II. Corps (Lord Hill), 27,300, headquarters Atli, distributed in the area Ath-Oudenarde-Ghent
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